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Abstract
Are there genuine mathematical explanations of physical phenomena, and if so, how 
can mathematical theories, which are typically thought to concern abstract math-
ematical objects, explain contingent empirical matters? The answer, I argue, is in 
seeing an important range of mathematical explanations as structural explanations, 
where structural explanations explain a phenomenon by showing it to have been an 
inevitable consequence of the structural features instantiated in the physical system 
under consideration. Such explanations are best cast as deductive arguments which, 
by virtue of their form, establish that, given the mathematical structure instantiated 
in the physical system under consideration, the explanandum had to occur. Against 
the claims of platonists such as Alan Baker and Mark Colyvan, I argue that formulat-
ing mathematical explanations as structural explanations in this way shows that we 
can accept that mathematics can play an indispensable explanatory role in empirical 
science without committing to the existence of any abstract mathematical objects.
Keywords Mathematics · Models · Explanation · Structure · Indispensability
This article belongs to the topical collection "Explanatory and Heuristic Power of Mathematics", 
edited by Sorin Bangu, Emiliano Ippoliti, and Marianna Antonutti.
This paper has had a long gestation period (partly due giving birth, moving jobs, and then giving 
birth again—to twins—in fairly quick succession), a consequence of which is that it is difficult 
to reconstruct a full list of all who have seen versions, to whom thanks are due. An early version 
was written during a period of research leave from the University of Liverpool, for which I remain 
grateful. I have presented versions of this paper at the Institute of Philosophy, Shanxi University, the 
University of Cambridge, the University of Leeds, the University of Manchester, the University of 
Nottingham, and the University of York, and I am grateful to audiences at those events for helpful 
discussions. The fast moving debate over mathematical explanation is such that the final version 
is substantially changed from the original, and in developing this version I have been particularly 
grateful to Juha Saatsi for an excellent set of written comments, as well as to two anonymous 
referees for this journal whose perceptive comments were extremely valuable.
 * Mary Leng 
 Mary.leng@york.ac.uk




Are there genuine mathematical explanations of physical phenomena, and if so, how 
can mathematical theories, which are typically thought to concern abstract math-
ematical objects, explain contingent empirical matters? Lange (2016), for example, 
argues that mathematical explanations of physical phenomena are a species of non-
causal explanations that he calls explanations by constraint. But how can facts about 
spatiotemporally isolated mathematical objects can act as constraints on the physi-
cal world? The answer, I will argue, is in seeing an important range of mathemati-
cal explanations as structural explanations, where structural explanations explain a 
phenomenon by showing it to have been an inevitable consequence of the structural 
features instantiated in the physical system under consideration. Such explanations 
are best cast as deductive arguments which, by virtue of their form, establish that, 
given the mathematical structure instantiated in the physical system under consid-
eration, the explanandum had to occur. The constraints placed on the world by the 
mathematical premises in these explanations are thus logical constraints: such expla-
nations show that, given structural features of the physical system, their explananda 
were inevitable as a matter of logic.
Several questions arise out of this picture. First, does couching so-called math-
ematical explanations of physical phenomena as structural explanations establish 
that these are genuine explanations? A full answer to this question would require a 
full account of what it is to explain, and this is not something that I will pursue here 
(though I endorse much of what Lange (2016) has to say in defence of taking so-
called ‘explanations by constraint’ as genuinely explanatory). My own view is there 
are features of these so-called ‘explanations’ that suggest that there is at least a case 
for including them as examples of genuine explanations. In particular, they supply 
important modal information about their explananda: they tell us why they had to 
occur given the structural features of the physical situation. They also offer oppor-
tunities for understanding provided by unification, through showing how apparently 
disparate phenomena are instances of a common structure.
Regardless, though, of whether what I call ‘structural explanations’ are genuine 
explanations or merely explanation-like (e.g. in providing some form of illumina-
tion/understanding of their target phenomena), what I am most keen to explore in 
this paper is a different question, that of whether the (explanatory- or explanation-
like) theoretical role played by such structural ‘explanations’ offers support for 
mathematical platonism. Perhaps we might be moved to accept an account of expla-
nation according to which all genuine explanations are causal. Nevertheless, as I will 
argue in Sect. 1, many so-called mathematical explanations of physical phenomena 
afford us at the very least important forms of understanding that are not available if 
focus on nominalistically-stated alternatives. So even if supplying modal informa-
tion about an observed phenomenon, and unifying disparate phenomena turn out 
to be not enough to count as providing an explanation in a strict sense, these still 
remain important theoretical roles played by mathematics in science that go beyond 
what would be available if we confined ourselves to purely nominalistically-stated 
alternatives. And this raises the question of whether, if what I am calling structural 
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‘explanations’ succeed where purely non-mathematical descriptions fail in enhanc-
ing our understanding of the physical world in these kinds of ways, this amounts to 
an indispensable theoretical role that supports platonism. Attending to the nature 
of structural explanations shows that any attempt to argue from the indispensable 
theoretical role of structural explanations to mathematical platonism must fail, for 
structural explanations of physical phenomena do not require that our structure-
characterising mathematical axioms are true of any mathematical objects, but only 
that they are true—or approximately true—when their non-logical terminology is 
interpreted to apply to systems of either actual, or idealized, physical objects. So 
admitting an indispensable theoretical role for mathematical-structural explanations 
does not support an inference to the existence of abstract mathematical objects.
The picture of mathematical explanations as structural explanations that I pre-
sent here is sketched in Leng (2012) and Leng (2021), but it has not been devel-
oped in full detail in previously published work. This paper fills in the details of 
this sketch. In Sect. 1 I look at some examples of the alleged ‘explanatory’ role of 
mathematics in physical science, and agree with platonists such as Baker and Coly-
van that there is important theoretical work done by mathematics in the examples 
they present that is not available if we focus solely on non-mathematical alterna-
tives. I side with Baker and Colyvan there in saying that the theoretical role played 
by mathematics in these examples should be thought of as an ‘explanatory’ role, 
but even for those not convinced that this is genuine explanation, I argue that Baker 
and Colyvan have at the very least indicated an important theoretical role played 
by mathematics in physical science, and this raises the question of how mathemat-
ics is able to play this role, and in particular of whether the ability of mathemati-
cal theories to play this kind of role requires the existence of mathematical objects. 
The remainder of the paper considers the question of whether the existence of these 
kinds of mathematical explanations of physical phenomena supports the existence 
of mathematical objects. Section 2 characterises a class of mathematical explana-
tions as structural explanations, arguing that they can be presented as deductively 
valid arguments whose premises include a mathematical theorem expressed modal 
structurally, together with empirical claims establishing that the conditions for the 
mathematical theorem are instantiated in the physical system under consideration. I 
suggest that these arguments should be thought of as genuinely explanatory by vir-
tue of providing important modal information: they show that the phenomenon to be 
explained had to occur, given the structural features that are physically instantiated. 
Additionally, by identifying mathematical-structural features that necessitate the 
occurrence of the phenomenon to be explained, they offer opportunities for explana-
tory unification, showing apparently disparate phenomena to be consequences of 
the very same mathematical-structural features. I also show that these explanations, 
which can be understood in modal structural terms, involve no commitment to math-
ematical objects platonistically construed. In Sect.  3 I consider the application of 
this account to real cases where mathematical structure is instantiated not directly 
in physical systems, but only in an idealised model of a physical description (in 
what, following Bokulich, 2008 I will call ‘structural model explanations’). I argue 
that the explanatory use of mathematics in these idealized model cases offers no 
further argument for realism than is already offered by the use of idealized models 
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to represent physical phenomena. I also point to a helpful feature of the structural 
account as compared to mapping account of applications of mathematics: while it is 
true that in many cases the relation of mathematics to reality is of a map to a terrain, 
if the structural account is correct, mathematics does not explain simply by provid-
ing such a map, but by showing how mathematical-structural dependencies in math-
ematical models reflect mathematical-structural dependences in the physical world. 
I conclude, then, that viewing mathematical explanations of structural explanations 
provides an understanding of how mathematics can play a significant theoretical role 
in our understanding of physical phenomena that does not require us to adopt a pla-
tonist account of mathematical objects.
2  Why think that mathematics does genuine explanatory work?
Since Alan Baker’s (2005) paper introducing the philosophy of mathematics world 
to the curious case of the periodical magicicada cicadas, much has been written on 
the alleged existence of mathematical explanations of physical phenomena. Typi-
cally, discussion has been divided along platonist/anti-platonist lines, with most pla-
tonists agreeing that there are such explanations, and most anti-platonists disagree-
ing (notable exceptions are Brown (2012) on the platonist side, and Leng (2012) 
on the anti-platonist side). For those who reject the claim that mathematics does 
genuine explanatory work in our scientific theories, a standard strategy has been to 
point to the nominalistic content of putative mathematical explanations of physi-
cal phenomena, holding that while these explanations may be characterised math-
ematically, all the genuine explanatory work in these explanations is carried by their 
nominalistic content, with mathematics being used as a convenient—and perhaps 
indispensable—way of indexing the explanatorily relevant physical facts. (Examples 
of strategies along these lines include Brown, 2012; Daly & Langford, 2009; Melia, 
2000; Saatsi, 2011) In Leng (2012) I side with platonists including Baker and Coly-
van (2011) in suggesting that if we focus on the nominalistic content of mathemati-
cal explanations of physical phenomena, we lose explanatory power.
Take for example Brown’s account of the cicada case. Brown (2012, p. 10) uses 
the notions of cycle factorizability and non-factorizability to pick out nominalisti-
cally characterizable features of cicada life-cycles that he takes are ultimately 
responsible for the prime-length period phenomenon. Although there is a clear link 
between these notions and the mathematical notions of ‘composite’ and ‘prime’ as 
applied to numbers, Brown notes that nonetheless they are intelligible in non-mathe-
matical terms (a cicada cycle is cycle factorizable if and only if it can be broken into 
repeated shorter cycles of equal duration without leaving any years out). A cycle is 
non-factorizable if and only if its associated number (of years) is prime, hence the 
relevance of talk of prime numbers in indexing the standard evolutionary explana-
tion of cicada period length. But the real explanatory work, Brown contends, is done 
by the nominalistically kosher feature of cycle lengths that is indexed by prime num-
bers (non-factorizability).
It certainly seems right that it is cycle-non-factorizability (along with the relevant 
evolutionary facts that the explanation presupposes about periodic predators) that is 
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responsible for the cicada’s behaviour. In that sense, the non-factorizability of the 
13 and 17 year cycles does explain why those cycles were chosen. But even though 
an adequate explanation can be afforded in terms of the nominalistically accepta-
ble notion of cycle-factorizability, there is at least a sense in which, by refusing to 
appeal to the more general notion of prime number as it relates to non-factorizable 
cycles, this explanation remains impoverished. By framing the explanation in terms 
of prime numbers (with the non-factorizable cycles being those that are indexed by 
prime numbers) we can make use of our knowledge of prime and composite num-
bers in order to understand more about the possibilities for similar periodic behav-
iour. For example, the fundamental theorem of algebra, which tells us that com-
posite numbers have a unique prime decomposition, can tell us that, of composite 
cycles, cycle lengths with fewer distinct prime factors would be preferable. So, for 
example, a 4-cycle would be preferable to a 6-cycle since it has only one prime fac-
tor (2) rather than two (2, 3), so while a 4 cycle would meet 2-cycle predators every 
time it occurred, it would only meet 3-cycle predators every fourth cycle (once every 
12  years). On the other hand, a 6-cycle creature would meet 2-cycle and 3-cycle 
predators every time it occurred, making that a worse choice of cycle length in con-
ditions where 2-cycle and 3-cycle predators occur. Such extrapolations concerning 
potential periodic behaviour come naturally when the explanation is framed in term 
of prime numbers, given our familiarity with their patterns, but are lost if we drop 
that framing and instead focus directly on the indexed property of cycle-factorizabil-
ity. The mathematical framing thus offers easy access to a range of modal informa-
tion concerning what would have happened had different cycle lengths been chosen, 
that is not present if we focus solely on cycle-factorizability. Along a similar vein, 
the well known ‘Bridges of Königsberg’ explanation using Euler’s theorem not only 
shows why a certain kind of walk is impossible, but also provides information about 
what kinds of bridge/landmass configurations would be required to make possible a 
Eulerian walk.
Focussing on cycle-factorizability also prevents us from seeing connections with 
other phenomena that are naturally indexed with prime numbers, but which have 
nothing to do with cycle lengths. A teacher may come to realise that classes of 30 
students are easier to work with than classes of 25, since in splitting into groups the 
latter can only be split evenly into 5 groups of 5 pupils, while the former has the 
option of 15 pairs, 6 groups of 5, 5 groups of 6, 3 groups of 10, or 2 of 15. Better 
choices of cycle lengths (for the purpose of avoiding predators) turn out to be worse 
choices of class sizes (for the purpose of allowing maximal opportunities for group 
work). Of course we could introduce a separate notion of collection-factorizability 
to apply to collections of discrete individuals, where a collection is factorizable if it 
can be broken up into a number of smaller collections of equal size without remain-
der. But there is obviously a common pattern here, and we are surely best placed to 
appreciate and understand that common pattern once we see the natural associations 
between collections of individuals, repeating cycles, and the prime and composite 
numbers that are used to index both. Along similar lines, Baker (2017) points to 
another example of a use of prime vs composite cycles as part of an explanation of 
a physical phenomena: an explanation of why fixed gear bikes where the numbers 
of cogs on front and back wheel are coprime see less wear from braking than bikes 
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where the pairs are not coprime. I agree with Baker that couching all of these expla-
nations in mathematical terms provides them with a topic-generality that adds a level 
of explanatoriness that goes beyond what is available if we focus on the nominalis-
tic content of each explanation. While nominalistic versions of each explanation are 
available that succeed in showing that the nominalistically characterizable features 
of the particular systems in question sufficed to guarantee that the observed phenom-
enon would occur, the mathematical explanations serve to add another explanatory 
dimension, the ability to unify a range of what at first glance may seem like different 
phenomena. This additional dimension, I would like to suggest, is a structural one: 
the mathematical explanations show in each case that the explanandum occurred as 
a consequence of structural features of the physical system that can be characterised 
mathematically. As the same theorem involving the same mathematical structure is 
involved in each case, the topic generality of mathematical explanations allows us to 
see each of these disparate phenomena as a consequence of one and the same struc-
tural feature1.
The work done by the mathematical framing in the typical examples of candi-
date mathematical explanations of physical phenomena, both in providing modal 
information about the explanandum and offering possibilities of unification of the 
phenomenon to be explained with apparently disparate phenomena supports our 
understanding of those phenomena in such a way that suggests to me at least that it 
is worthy of being called explanatory. In what follows, I will accept that examples 
such as the number theoretic explanation of cicada behaviour and the graph theo-
retic explanation of the impossibility of completing a Eulerian walk through Königs-
berg are genuine mathematical explanations of physical phenomena. I will offer an 
account of how these explanations work and argue that, if they do work in this way, 
our use of these explanations in empirical science does not commit us to mathemati-
cal platonism. Some readers may remain unconvinced, however, that the virtues I 
have pointed to of these so-called mathematical ‘explanations’ (i.e., providing modal 
information and unifying apparently disparate phenomena) suffice to show that 
these uses of mathematics are genuinely explanatory. But even if we agreed not to 
use the ‘e’ world to describe them, to the extent that we think that these theoretical 
virtues are virtues worth having, there remains a question of how mathematics can 
serve these functions (of providing modal information and theoretical unification), 
and whether using mathematics for these purposes presupposes platonism. For the 
reader who is not convinced my use of the ‘e’ word to talk about these examples, 
I hope the structural account I offer of how mathematics works to provide modal 
information and possibilities of unification will still be of interest in showing that if 
we wish to use mathematical theories for these purposes, doing so will not commit 
us to the existence of mathematical objects.
1 Talk of shared structural features may suggest to some readers a Platonist interpretation in the form of 
the ante rem structuralism of Shapiro (1997). In Sect. 3.3 I show that this Platonist interpretation can be 




3  Mathematical explanations as structural explanations.
I propose that the mathematically couched explanations of cicada behaviour and of 
the impossibility of Eulerian walks through Königsberg, along with other examples 
that have been offered in the literature on mathematical explanation are examples 
of what I, following Bolulich (2008) (who herself follows Peter Railton (1980) & 
Hughes (1989)) will call structural explanations. Structural explanations explain by 
showing an empirical phenomenon to be a consequence of the mathematical struc-
ture of the empirical situation. According to Bokulich (2008, p. 149),
a structural explanation is one in which the explanandum is explained by 
showing how the (typically mathematical) structure of the theory itself limits 
what sorts of objects, properties, states, or behaviors are admissible within the 
framework of that theory, and then showing that the explanandum is in fact a 
consequence of that structure.
But how does one show that an explanandum is a consequence of the mathematical 
structure of a theory? In answering this question, as my own interest is specifically 
in the status of mathematical hypotheses in structural explanations, rather than fol-
lowing Bokulich’s discussion of this matter directly, I will focus more closely on 
how mathematical theories characterize structures that can be used in structural 
explanations, rather than discussing mathematically-structured empirical theories, 
which is where Bokulich’s own attention lies.
In order to see what could be meant by empirical phenomena being consequences 
of the mathematical structure of an empirical set up, it will be helpful to consider an 
understanding of mathematical theories that is common to most forms of structural-
ism in the philosophy of mathematics. Consider a pure mathematical theory, pre-
sented axiomatically. These axioms will typically include logical terminology and 
some primitive terms. For example, in the (2nd order) Peano axioms for number 
theory, we have primitive terms ‘zero (0)’, ‘number (N)’ and ‘successor (s)’, where 
‘0’ is a singular term, ‘Nx’ a unary predicate, and ‘s(x)’ a unary function. The axi-
oms can be expressed as follows:
1. N(0) (‘zero is a number’).
2. ∀x(Nx ⊃ Ns(x)) (‘The successor of every number is a number’).
3. (∀x)(Nx ⊃ s(x) ≠ 0) (‘Zero is not the successor of any number’).
4. (∀x)(∀y)((Nx & Ny) ⊃ (x ≠ y ⊃ s(x) ≠ s(y))). (‘distinct numbers have distinct suc-
cessors’).
5. (∀F)(∀x)((F0 & (∀x)(Nx ⊃ (Fx ⊃ Fs(x)))) ⊃ (∀x)(Nx ⊃ Fx)) (‘If any property is such 
that it applies to 0 and, if it applies to a number it also applies to that number’s 
successor, than that property applies to all numbers.’).
We can abbreviate the conjunction of these axioms as PA〈0, N, s〉 (indicating the 
primitive terms).
A question arises of what we should make of the primitive terminology in 
such axiomatizations. There are two basic approaches on the table. An ‘assertory’ 
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understanding of an axiom system sees its primitive terms as independently mean-
ingful, and aiming to pick out some specific objects, predicates, and functions. The 
axioms are then attempts to assert basic truths about these independently meaning-
ful primitives. On the other hand, an ‘algebraic’ understanding sees the primitive 
terminology as not having a meaning independently of the axiom system in which 
they occur, and (much like the ‘unknowns’ in a system of equations with various 
unknowns) as being given their meaning contextually by the axioms themselves2. 
Clearly an algebraic understanding is appropriate for some systems of axioms: the 
axioms for group theory, for example, can be thought of as defining what would 
have to be true of any collection, G, of objects with binary operator + and distin-
guished element 0 in order to count as a group. There is no specific intended inter-
pretation of ‘G’, ‘ + ’ and ‘0’ about which the axioms aim to assert truths. What the 
leading versions of mathematical structuralism (such as Stewart Shapiro’s ante rem 
structuralism (Shapiro, 1997) and Geoffrey Hellman’s modal structuralism (Hell-
man, 1989)) have in common is that they assume an algebraic understanding of all 
axiomatic theories3.
The correctness of mathematical structuralism as a picture of pure mathematics 
is not what is at issue here; my interest is only in the ‘algebraic’ approach to axiom 
systems assumed by structuralists. What is important about the algebraic under-
standing of mathematical theories in this context is the sense it allows us to make of 
the notion of mathematical structure, and in particular of the notions of a system of 
objects instantiating a mathematical structure, and of truths that are ‘true in virtue 
of’ that structure. For a particular system to instantiate an axiomatically character-
ized mathematical structure is simply for the axioms characterizing the structure to 
be true when their primitive constants, predicates, and function symbols are given 
an appropriate interpretation in the terms of that system. We can, for example, find 
particular mathematical systems instantiating axiomatically characterized math-
ematical structures: the natural number structure has an instantiation in the sets if we 
interpret 0 as ∅, s(x) as the function that takes a set A to its singleton {A}, and the 
predicate Nx as being true of a set A if and only if A is in the intersection of all sets 
containing ∅ and closed under the operation of taking successors (i.e., if and only 
if A ∈ {∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, …}. But we can also find ‘concrete’ systems instantiating 
some mathematical structures: the group axioms, for example, can be interpreted as 
truths about the simple system consisting of symmetric rotations of a square. Here, 
G is the collection of possible rotations: (id = keep as is;  r1 = rotate 90° clockwise, 
 r2 = rotate 180°,  r3 = rotate 270° clockwise). Of these, 0 is interpreted as the ‘id’ 
rotation, and the binary + operation is the result of performing two operations con-
secutively (so that, e.g.,  r1 +  r2 =  r3). And, to take us back to Baker’s cicada example, 
if we idealize somewhat to forget about the eventual demise of the earth, the series 
2 The labels ‘algebraic’ and ‘assertory’ are due to Geoffrey Hellman (2003), but the debate over how to 
understand axiomatic theories is older, going back at least to Frege and Hilbert, who corresponded over 
this matter (with Frege on the assertory and Hilbert on the algebraic side of the debate Frege, 1980).
3 In Leng (2007) I argue that an algebraic approach to mathematical theories is also shared by other 
contemporary philosophical accounts of mathematics, including fictionalism and full-blooded platonism.
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of earth-years starting from a given 0 in which cicadas appear and continuing with-
out end can be viewed as an instantiation of the natural number axioms, with the 
function ‘s(x)’ being interpreted as ‘the year following year x’.
Consider now a system of objects and relations (mathematical or physical) that 
instantiates an axiomatically characterised structure. There will of course be a range 
of truths about that given system. For example, in our set theoretic system instan-
tiating the Peano axioms, when supplemented with definitions of the individual 
numbers and the ‘less-than’ relation ‘<’), it will be true that the object it calls ‘2’ 
(ss0, i.e. in this case, {{∅}} will be a member of the object it calls ‘3’ (sss0, i.e., 
{{{∅}}}), and it will also be true that 2 < 3. But only the latter of these is, I claim, 
true in virtue of the axiomatically characterised structure provided by PA〈0, N, s〉. 
The axiomatic setting helps us to understand this difference. When we supplement 
the axioms with the appropriate definitions, ‘2 < 3’ is a logical consequence of PA〈0, 
N, s〉 (and thus true in all interpretations of these axioms), whereas ‘2 ∈ 3’ is not a 
logical consequence of the structure-characterising axioms. In general, if structur-
ally characterized axioms are true when interpreted as about a particular system, 
then we can say that a truth about that system is true in virtue of the mathematical 
structure characterized by those axioms when it is an interpretation of a claim that 
follows logically from those axioms.
We can now make sense of the notion of a structural explanation to which I wish to 
draw attention, in cases where the structure in question is characterized by math-
ematical axioms. Such a structural explanation explains by showing (a) that the sys-
tem to be explained can be viewed as an instance of a mathematical structure, and 
(b) showing that the explanandum is true in virtue of that structure, i.e., that it is a 
consequence of the characterizing axioms and relevant definitions (when suitably 
interpreted). As such, we can think of the general form of a structural explanation 
(involving axiomatically characterised mathematical structure) as an explanatory 
argument as follows:
[Mathematical Premise, MP] Mathematical theorem, modal-structurally char-
acterised (i.e., of the form, ‘necessarily, in any system satisfying <Axioms>, 
<Theorem>’)4.
[Empirical Premises, EP] Empirical claims justifying the claim that <Axi-
oms> are true when interpreted as about the physical system under considera-
tion.
Therefore.
[Explanandum] < Theorem > is true of the system under consideration.
 Of course, when it comes to real-life examples of mathematical explanations of 
physical phenomena, some work may be needed in order to discover this general 
4 The modal structural characterisation follows Hellman (1989).
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form in the explanations as provided. We will see below how it might work in some 
particular cases.
Before we move to examples, however, it is worth noting up front a feature of 
structural explanations thus characterised, that may ring alarm bells given the his-
tory of accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science. By couching the gen-
eral form of structural explanations as deductive, explanatory arguments that invoke 
a necessitated conditional (in their modal-structurally characterised mathematical 
premise) this account makes structural explanations look suspiciously close to cov-
ering law explanations, in this case a deductive-nomological explanation where a 
mathematical ‘law’ takes the place of an empirical one, providing ‘nomic expect-
ability’ to the conclusion of the argument as explanandum. Despite the well-trodden 
concerns about the covering law model as a general account of explanation, here I 
will embrace this similarity. I note some relevant differences: (1) the restriction of 
our ‘law’ to a modal-structurally characterised mathematical theorem avoids some 
difficulties concerning the kinds of generalisations that can be cited as ‘laws’ in such 
explanations; (2) the requirement that the empirical premises serve to justify the 
claim that the axioms applied in the mathematical premises apply to the physical 
system under consideration avoids some concerns about permitting arguments with 
irrelevant premises to count as explanations. However, one feature that my account 
does share with the D–N model is its tolerance for explanatory symmetries: given 
that (in the famous ‘flagpole’ case) it is equally a theorem that if the length of the 
shadow is x, the height of the flagpole is y and that, if the height of the flagpole is y, 
the length of the shadow is x, we can just as well use information about the length 
of the shadow along with structurally interpreted mathematical results to provide a 
structural explanation of the height of the flagpole as we can use information about 
the height of the flagpole to explain the length of the shadow. I do not have the space 
for a full discussion of this case here, so I will simply note that this is a bullet that I 
am willing to bite5.
5 The issue of explanatory symmetries is also raised as a problem for Lange’s ‘explanations by con-
straint’, which also look like they are best cast as explanatory arguments. In Because without Cause, 
Lange tries to avoid symmetries by arguing that ‘reversed’ versions of his explanations by constraint 
are ruled out because they appeal to features that are “not understood to be constitutive of the physical 
arrangement with which [the explanatory why question] is concerned” (Lange, 2016, p. 43). Craver and 
Povich (2017) find this account wanting (though see Lange, 2018 for a reply). I wish to embrace the 
potential for empirical symmetries in part because I think the kinds of features that contextual infor-
mation might determine to be constitutive of a physical arrangement when we consider a why question 
might well be such as to allow perfectly acceptable reversals. Those who hold that true explanations can-
not admit of symmetries might wish to resist taking ‘displaying the phenomenon to be nomically expect-
able’ to be a way of explaining things. My own view, though, is that ‘showing it to be nomically expect-
able’ should be considered a perfectly good way of explaining a phenomenon, and it is only a prejudice 
in favour of the causal that prevents us from accepting that perfectly good explanations may sometimes 




A simple example of a structural explanation is provided if one considers a rather 
mundane puzzle about the difference between mattress flipping and tyre rotating, 
discussed by Brian Hayes (2005) in a popular article in American Scientist (2005). 
We are advised to flip/rotate double-sided mattresses periodically in order to ensure 
even wear. There are four possible ways of fitting a mattress into a standard rec-
tangular bed, and by flipping/rotating mattresses periodically, our aim is to cycle 
through these four configurations so that over its lifetime the mattress gets equal use 
in each position. Similarly, it was once considered good practice to move the tyres 
on a car around, so as to even out wear on the tyres, and it is prudent, if one is doing 
this, to ensure that the tyres are moved around evenly so that no one tyre spends too 
long in the same position. There is (what Hayes calls) a simple ‘golden rule’ for 
moving tyres: a single operation that one can do each time one moves the tyres to 
ensure that, after enough applications, each tyre will have occupied each of the four 
positions it can take exactly once, so that wear is even. If one simply rotates the tyres 
around the car a single turn at each change (making an arbitrary choice at the start 
of whether to move clockwise or anticlockwise), one can be confident that, after 
applying this same operation repeatedly all tyres will have occupied all positions. 
This means that we do not need to remember how we positioned the tyres on previ-
ous occasions. If we simply resolve always to move a single turn clockwise (say), we 
will ensure even wear without having to keep track of previous positions.
If we think of the three main symmetric operations one can do to ‘flip’ a mattress 
(i.e., rotate 180° across each of the three orthogonal axes through its centre point), 
clearly no single one of these on its own would provide us with a golden rule for 
mattress turning: if we were always to rotate around its short vertical axis, for exam-
ple, we would find ourselves always sleeping on the same side of the mattress, with 
the head and foot flipping each time. Hayes wondered, though, whether there was a 
single combination of these operations which, if one cycled through that combina-
tion at each ‘flipping’, would ensure that, over a period of time, the mattress would 
take all possible configurations, thus avoiding the problem of remembering how the 
mattress was configured on previous configurations before choosing which opera-
tion to take next time.
A quick internet search of mattress flipping advice suggests that no such solution 
has been found: the best advice available, Hayes tells us, seems to be to practice sea-
sonal flipping, e.g. flipping across the short horizontal axis for one season and then 
across the long horizontal axis the next, to cycle through the four possible mattress 
positions over a year. Why is this? Why isn’t there a single combination of moves, 
which if one repeats that same combination at each flipping would ensure that all 
positions of the mattress would be taken? And why does the mattress case differ from 
the superficially similar problem of tyre rotation? The answers can be seen once one 
realizes that the rotations of mattress form a 4-group. Since groups are closed, any 
combination of any number rotations is equivalent to a single rotation. And since (as 
we have already noted) no single rotation provides a golden rule, no combination of 
these will either. Why are things different in the tyre case? Because, though both are 
4-groups, the tyre group is (an instance of) the cyclic group of order 4 (the group 
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of 2-dimensional rotations of the square that we saw earlier), whereas the mattress 
rotations instantiate the Klein 4-group, which contains no operation which, when 
repeatedly applied to itself, cycle through all the four operations in the group.6 So the 
fact that the two rotation sets are instances of two different groups explains Hayes’s 
explanandum: why is there a golden rule for tyres but not for mattresses?
Couched in our general terms, we can present this explanation of a contrast as 
involving two separate structural explanatory arguments, one showing that there is 
single move which, repeated, will cycle through all of the possible mattress posi-
tions, and another showing that there is a single move which, repeated, will cycle 
through all of the possible tyre positions. If we bundle the definitions of the Klein 
4-group and the cyclic group of order 4 into our ‘structure characterising’ axioms 
respectively, one argument will take the form: 
[MP] Necessarily, if 〈0, a, b, ab〉 is a Klein 4-group, then there is no element 
in 〈0, a, b, ab〉 whose repeated application will cycle through all the members 
of the group.
[EP], when ‘0’ is interpreted as no movement, ‘a’ as flipping across the vertical 
axis, ‘b’ as flipping across the short horizontal axis, and ‘ab’ as flipping across 
the long horizontal axis, these rotations of a mattress form a Klein 4-group.
Therefore.
[Explanandum]: there is no mattress rotation whose repeated application will 
cycle through all the possible positions of the mattress.
 Similarly, the ‘tyres’ argument will use the empirical premise that, when ‘0’ is 
interpreted as no movement, ‘a’ as moving all tyres one space clockwise,  a2 as mov-
ing all tyres two spaces, and  a3 as moving all tyres 3 spaces clockwise (or one space 
anti-clockwise), these tyre rotations form a cyclic group of order 4, to conclude that 
there is a golden rule for tyre rotation.
To move from this ‘toy’ example to some of the examples of mathematical expla-
nations of physical phenomena mentioned already, the famous bridges of Königs-
berg explanation (as discussed by Pincock, 2007) is relatively easily put in this form, 
as follows:
6 The group tables are as follows:
Klein 4-group
0 a b ab
a 0 ab b
b ab 0 a
ab b a 0
Cyclic group of order 4
0 a a2 a3
a a2 a3 0
a2 a3 0 a
a3 0 a a2
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[MP] Necessarily, if 〈Nodes, Edges〉 is an instance of a connected graph, then 
if 〈Nodes, Edges〉 permits a Eulerian walk it must have either zero or two 
nodes with an odd number of edges.
[EP] When ‘Nodes’ is interpreted as ‘landmasses’ and ‘edges’ is interpreted 
as ‘bridges’, Königsberg in 1735 is an instance of a connected graph with four 
nodes with an odd number of edges.
Therefore.
[Explanandum] Königsberg in 1735 does not permit a Eulerian walk.
 Finally, as mentioned before, while Baker’s cicada example requires something of 
an idealization to fit straightforwardly this model (assuming that the sequence of 
years in which cicadas appear has no end)7, having made that idealization we can we 
can sketch the explanation in rough terms as follows (following Baker in adding a 
biological premise to fill in the evolutionary constraints):
[MP] Necessarily, if PA〈0, N, s〉, arithmetic progressions of length n and m 
that have the same first member overlap minimally when n and m are coprime, 
and a number m is coprime with all numbers n <2m iff m is prime.
[EP] When ‘0’ is interpreted as some first year in which two broods of periodi-
cal magicicada cicadas appear together, ‘N’ as interpreted as the collection of 
years including and following that first year, and ‘s’ is interpreted as ‘the year 
after’, PA〈0, N, s〉 hold, and the sequence of years in which a magicicadas with 
period length m occur form an arithmetic progression of length m.
[Biological premise] It is advantageous for cicadas to choose periods which 
minimize overlap with periods of other periodical creatures.
Therefore:
[Explanandum] Prime number periods are advantageous for cicadas.
Three questions arise. First of all, do so-called structural explanations deserve to 
be viewed as genuine explanations? Second, does the use of structure-characterizing 
mathematical axioms in these explanations commit us to assigning an explanatory 
role to abstract mathematical objects (or indeed, abstract mathematical structures)? 
And finally, can all or even most purported examples of mathematical explanations 
of empirical phenomena be accounted for as structural explanations? My answer to 
these questions, in brief, are: yes; no; and not quite. I will consider the first two of 
these questions here, before turning to the third in Sect. 3.
7 This idealization is inessential. It is made for the convenience of using a straightforward instantiation 
of the Peano axiom structure in the sequence of years in our explanatory argument. Since the theorem we 
are using will also apply also to apply to finite initial segments of the natural numbers, we could avoid 
the idealization and talk instead about theorems that hold in finite initial segments of n. I prefer to make 
the idealization for simplicity in formulating the explanatory argument, since, as I will argue in the next 
section, introducing idealizations into our mathematical explanations of physical phenomena will often 
be required anyway, and doing so incurs no additional platonistic debt.
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3.2  Are structural ‘explanations’ genuine explanations?
Structural explanations certainly provide answers to the kind of ‘why’ questions 
that we ask in demanding explanations of phenomena. Why do the cicadas have the 
period length they have? Because the sequence of successive years is an instance of 
a natural number structure; the sequence of years in which the cicadas appear is an 
instance of an arithmetic progression within that structure; in any natural number 
structure, arithmetic progressions with prime differences between terms will overlap 
minimally with other progressions; and non-overlapping periods are advantageous. 
Why is there no golden rule for mattress flipping when there is one for tyre rota-
tion? Because the mattress operations are an instance of the Klein 4-group; in any 
Klein 4-group, no one element can be repeatedly applied to itself to cycle through 
all four operations; and a golden rule would require there to be such a cycle. Perhaps 
this in itself is enough to present these purported explanations as genuinely explana-
tory. But for those looking for something more, note that as I have presented these 
explanations, the explanans in each case involves appeal to a general (structural) law 
(whose modal status as a logically necessary truth is supported by the fact that the 
consequent is derivable from the antecedent): “necessarily, in any natural number 
structure, arithmetic progressions with prime differences between terms will overlap 
minimally with other progressions”; “necessarily, in any Klein 4-group, no one ele-
ment can be repeatedly applied to cycle through all four operations”. By deriving 
observed phenomenon from premises that include a modal-structural law (a claim 
about what must be true in all structures of a given sort), I have already noted that 
these structural explanations share important features of DN-explanations—they 
explain by providing what Salmon (1989, p. 57) calls “nomic expectability—the 
expectability on the basis of lawful connections”.
Another reason to think of structural explanations as genuinely explanatory is 
that they meet the criteria required for ‘distinctively mathematical explanations’ out-
lined in Marc Lange’s recent defence of non-causal explanations. Lange (2016, pp. 
5–6) holds that what he calls ‘distinctively mathematical explanations’ work.
by showing how the fact to be explained could not have been otherwise—
indeed, was inevitable to a stronger degree than could result from the action of 
causal powers.
The modal elements of structural explanations as I have characterised them help to 
show how these explanations establish that, given the structural features of instan-
tiated in the target system, the explanandum of a structural explanation could not 
have been otherwise. Modality occurs in these explanations at two points. First is 
in the modal-structural mathematical premise. Here the necessity at work is logical 
necessity, and our justification for taking the MPs as true is the existence of a deri-
vation of the consequent from the antecedent. The second modal element in these 
explanations is the fact that they are deductively valid arguments: the inevitabil-
ity of the explanandum given the premises is established through showing that it 
is a consequence of those premises. While this second modal element justifies the 
claim that these explanations work by showing how the fact to be explained could 
not have been otherwise, it is the first modal element that meets Lange’s criterion 
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for these explanations to count as ‘distinctively mathematical’. By showing that their 
explananda follow from logically necessary truths about what holds in any struc-
ture satisfying certain structure-characterising axioms, these explanations display by 
their form that the inevitability of the explanandum is stronger than causal.
Finally, to the extent that unification is a form of explanation, by displaying 
physical phenomena as consequences of the mathematical structure instantiated in 
a physical system, it is easy to see how structural explanations can serve to unify. 
Structural explanations involve a mathematical premise which is a modal-structur-
ally characterised mathematical theorem, as well as an empirical premise containing 
information to establish that the physical system under consideration is such as to 
satisfy the antecedent of the modal-structural theorem in the mathematical premise. 
Structural explanations of this sort can unify apparently disparate phenomena when 
it can be shown that the structural explanations of those phenomena appeal to the 
very same mathematical result.
3.3  Ontological commitments of structural explanations
As mentioned above, in the recent debate over platonism and anti-platonism in the 
philosophy of mathematics, the existence of genuine mathematical explanations of 
physical phenomena has been held to support mathematical platonism. And my talk 
above of ‘instantiation of a mathematical structure’ in a physical system might sug-
gest that structural explanations as I have characterised them are no less committed 
to a form of platonism, in the form of realism about the mathematical structures 
instantiated. However, the modal-structural characterisation of the mathematical 
premises of structural explanations shows that an inference from the existence of 
mathematical-structural explanations of physical phenomena to platonism is not 
warranted. In fact, structural explanations as I have characterised them (where a 
mathematical structure is shown to be instantiated in an empirical system, so that 
truths about that system can be displayed as holding in virtue of that structure) 
require no specifically mathematical ontology.
Although mathematical theories (such as, in the examples we have considered, 
number theory, group theory, and graph theory) are used in structural explanations 
of physical phenomena, we are not required to assume that the axioms of such theo-
ries are true of a realm of abstract mathematical objects. Rather, as indicated by 
the modal-structural formulation of the MPs in our examples, we may simply view 
the pure mathematical theory that is involved in the explanation as telling us what 
would have to be true, were there a system instantiating the structure characterized 
by the axioms, something that we can discover simply by inquiring into the conse-
quences of the axioms of the theory. Having shown mathematically that any system 
exhibiting a given structure has a particular feature (e.g., that in any instance of the 
Klein 4-group, no element can be repeatedly applied to itself to cycle through all 
four elements of the group), we can transfer this information to the concrete instan-
tiation we have found. Structural explanations of this sort may make essential use of 
mathematical theories to explain empirical phenomena, but such essential use does 
not require us to posit the existence of a special realm of mathematical objects about 
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which these theories assert truths, only that such a theory is, when appropriately 
interpreted, true of the concrete system whose behaviour we are trying to explain.
There are, of course, modal commitments incurred in viewing these explanations 
as involving claims about what would have to be true, were any system to instantiate 
the axioms. As I have said, the necessity at hand here is logical necessity (where, 
‘necessarily, if 〈Axioms〉 then 〈Theorem〉’ holds if and only if 〈Theorem〉 is a logi-
cal consequence of 〈Axioms〉). So the nominalist who wishes to adopt this account 
of explanation and hold that the structural laws involved in these explanations are 
literally true will have to commit to the truth of some logical necessities (or, equiva-
lently, to the truth of some claims about what follows from our axioms). But these 
modal commitments are no more than are already incurred in the leading fictional-
ist accounts of mathematics. Hartry Field, for example, is clear in Science without 
Numbers (1980) and papers following (including Field (1984), Field (1989) about 
the requirement to include primitive modal operators in his fictionalist account of 
mathematics, endorsing the considerations in favour of primitive modality outlined 
by Georg Kreisel (1967). Likewise I defend the use of such operators in my own 
version of ‘easy road’ nominalism in Leng (2007) arguing that attempts to reduce 
modal claims to truths about set theoretic models fail since it is modal facts them-
selves that determine whether a set theoretic reduction is adequate. There will of 
course be those who will worry that the nominalist appeal to modality is problem-
atic—perhaps because we often make use of the mathematical machinery of model 
theory to discover modal truths, or because they think that modal truths just are 
truths about set theoretic models. However, to the extent that these worries about the 
modal commitments of fictionalism arise, they arise already independently of the 
issue of the use of modal truths (about what follows from structure-characterizing 
axioms) in structural explanations. So this modal element of the mathematical expla-
nations we have considered raises no new problem for mathematical fictionalists.
4  From structural explanations to structural model explanations
Are most, or even many, mathematical explanations of physical phenomena best 
understood as structural explanations, explaining by showing that their target sys-
tem is an instance of a mathematical structure? I have argued that the cicada expla-
nation can be understood as a structural explanation, where the axioms of number 
theory are interpreted as truths about the system of years consisting of some initial 
years in which cicadas appear, with the ‘successor’ relation being the ‘the following 
year’ relation. And I have presented a very simple example of a structural explana-
tion involving group theory and a relevant difference between features of the cyclic 
group of order 4 and the Klein 4-group. In the first of these examples we had to 
introduce an element of idealization to allow the axioms to be interpreted as truths: 
we had to assume that the sequence of Earth years continued without end. (This 
idealization though false, was innocuous enough given that it was only behaviour 
at a finite initial segment that was needed for the explanation.) The second exam-
ple required no idealization, but was admittedly rather simple, as is the explanation 
in the example given of the Königsberg bridges. It is difficult to find many serious 
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examples of genuine structural explanations of this sort in empirical science (though 
group theory is a powerful tool in chemistry when applied to symmetries of mol-
ecules). While for some finite mathematical structures we can find physical instan-
tiations, these structures are often so simple that any empirical phenomena we might 
try to explain with reference to the structure will be independently obvious already 
(as, arguably, is the case with the mattress-flipping explanation). And even for finite 
mathematical structures, these may be more clearly instantiated in idealized mod-
els of empirical phenomena rather than directly. Furthermore, most mathematical 
structures are not finite, and so may not have a physical instantiation (or are at best 
approximately instantiated as in the case of modelling years using the natural num-
bers or, as, for example, when we consider localized physical space to be an instan-
tiation of Euclidean geometry). While our scientific theories are mathematical to the 
core, where complex mathematical structures, and sophisticated, genuinely informa-
tive explanations, are involved in these theories it is generally the case that much 
work needs to be done to fit the mathematics to physical reality. Simple instantiation 
of a structure is rare. More often a process of modelling must occur in order to bring 
the phenomena into contact with mathematical theory. Thus, most interesting struc-
tural explanations in mathematics will take the form of what, again following Boku-
lich (2008, p. 147), I will call structural model explanations, explanations where a 
mathematical structure is instantiated not in a physical system but in an idealized 
model of that system.
4.1  Mathematical explanations as structural model explanations
The most basic form of a structural model explanation explains by hypothesizing a 
model instantiating the structure of a given mathematical theory, showing that some 
facts about that model are true in virtue of that structure, and then relating that model 
to some empirical phenomenon to be explained by means of the model. The ‘model-
ling’ relation is as ever a complex one: it may involve resemblance, approximation, 
or perhaps more formal mappings (isomorphisms, homomorphisms), and will very 
often involve viewing the phenomenon modelled as related not to the whole structure 
in the model, but to some smaller substructure embedded in that model. The model-
ling relation may be described formally by means of a partial structures approach, 
as developed, e.g., by Bueno, French and Ladyman (see, e.g., French (2000), Bueno 
et al.(2002)), though we may find that the ultimate tie of model to modelled will be 
looser than can be formally characterized by such a theory. Indeed, it is likely that 
the formal framework of partial structures may only apply after a degree of model-
ling and idealization has already occurred, so as to exhibit relations between various 
models of increasing abstraction, rather than model and reality itself, which may be 
tied by fundamentally informal links (a possibility acknowledged by defenders of 
the partial structures view). Pincock (2012) provides a book-length study of the use 
of mathematical models to represent physical phenomena. Rather than attempt a full 
discussion of this complex issue how idealized models represent, though, let us sim-
ply assume that where models are aptly chosen, we can draw inferences about the 
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real systems they represent. In such cases, we may ask, how can we transfer explana-
tory considerations from model to system modelled?
Given an axiomatically characterized mathematical theory, then, we can imag-
ine that that theory is instantiated in some model system. Suppose that this model 
system has a subsystem that is held to be ‘apt’—to be appropriately related by some 
informal ‘representation’ relation to an empirical system we wish to investigate 
(often, this subsystem will be the model system itself). The relation between the 
subsystem of our mathematical model and the empirical system under investigation 
may of course be mediated by further models—e.g., we may first need to abstract an 
idealized system from the empirical system we wish to consider, and then show that 
this idealized system bears appropriate structural relations to the subsystem of our 
original mathematical theory. But without going into the complexities of how such 
a relation may be established (and therefore of how it is the subsystem in the model 
is held to aptly represent the system modelled), let us simply assume for now that 
the subsystem of our model that instantiates a mathematical structure is indeed held 
to be true (enough) to the empirical system under investigation. Suppose now that 
we show some properties to be true in this subsystem of our mathematical model 
simply in virtue of the structure it instantiates. And suppose that these properties of 
the subsystem are seen to correspond (via our loose modelling relation) to empirical 
properties observed in the empirical system under investigation. Then an explana-
tion of these empirical properties may be that they hold of the empirical system in 
virtue of its mathematical structure: given that the empirical system is well mod-
elled by a subsystem of the larger mathematical structure, the empirical phenomena 
observed were to be expected, as (interpreted) consequences of the axioms charac-
terizing that structure.
An example will help us to understand the processes at work in this loose sketch. 
Given that there is wind at all, at any point in time there will be at least one point 
on the earth’s surface with no wind. Why is this? The ‘Hairy Ball Theorem’ from 
topology provides an explanation. In order to give this explanation we must start by 
preparing the empirical phenomena (wind patterns) for mathematical description. 
This involves some idealization. First, we forget the fact that the layer of air in the 
atmosphere above the earth’s surface has depth, and that wind movements are differ-
ent at different depths. Instead we think of a single layer of air on the earth’s surface, 
with no depth. We then need to think about the direction and strength of wind at 
various points on the earth’s surface. Over a large scale, we can measure prevail-
ing wind direction at a point by a weather vane centred on that point—this gives us 
a horizontal direction of the wind as a 2-dimensional tangent to the earth’s surface 
at that point (e.g., as coming from a North North Easterly direction). We can also 
measure its speed/strength at that point by means of a spinning anemometer (meas-
uring the number of rotations of spinning cups in a given time period). To each point 
where measuring instruments are located, our measurements therefore allow us to 
associate a direction and a magnitude: or, in mathematical terms, a vector (meas-
ured using an appropriate measurement scale), where the direction of each vector 
is always at a tangent to the earth’s surface. Extrapolating this to the small scale, 
we can think of wind direction as being defined at each point on the earth’s surface 
by a tangent vector. Furthermore, we can assume that changes to the direction and 
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magnitude of these vectors as we move across the earth’s surface are continuous. 
Thus we can think of the essential features of the wind as being represented by a 
continuous function corresponding points on the earth’s surface to vectors.
This ‘prepared description’ (to use Nancy Cartwright’s terminology (Cartwright, 
1983, p. 15)) of wind behaviour, achieved by a number of idealizations as well as 
by applying a mathematical measurement scale8, enables us to see the phenome-
non of wind movement in a wider mathematical perspective. In particular, we have 
described the wind as a tangential vector field on the surface of the Earth. If we 
now take that surface to be topologically equivalent to a sphere (ignoring incon-
venient tunnels) then we can apply a theorem of topology to the wind system we 
have described. According to the ‘Hairy Ball Theorem’ of topology, “there does 
not exist an everywhere nonzero tangent vector field on the 2-sphere S2” (Weis-
stein, web resource). So given that there is any wind at all on the earth’s surface (so 
that the vector field in our model is not everywhere zero), there must be some point 
on the earth’s surface where the value of the tangent vector representing the wind 
speed and direction is zero (i.e., there is no wind at that point). What happens in the 
area around a point with zero wind? Well, wind cannot flow in or out of that point 
as we are hypothesizing that wind speed and direction is zero there, so while there 
may still be zero wind at adjacent points, when the wind in the vicinity of this zero 
point is non-zero once more it must initially spiral around the no-wind area, as in a 
cyclone. To envisage what is going on we may imagine the hairy ball of the theo-
rem’s title. What the theorem tells us is that one cannot continuously comb a hairy 
ball flat—the best we can do is to create a cowlick with a hair sticking straight up 
in the middle and adjacent hairs circling around. (The flat hairs represent non-zero 
tangent vectors; the hair that remains sticking up would of course no longer be a 
tangent vector, so in order for the combing to remain a continuous tangential vector 
field it must be zeroed.)
We have, therefore, a mathematical explanation of an empirical phenomenon 
(the inevitable occurrence of certain wind patterns)9. The explanation is a model 
explanation: we do not apply the mathematics directly to the empirical phenomenon, 
but first prepare the phenomenon for mathematical description through a process of 
9 In fact, as Alan Baker (2005) has pointed out, examples such as these are somewhat tenuous, since the 
phenomenon to be explained is not one that has been independently noticed or even verified: it is more 
a prediction of the mathematics than a previously noted puzzle crying out for explanation. Nevertheless, 
since I am presuming for the purposes of this paper that there are some genuine mathematical explana-
tions of empirical phenomena, rather than trying to establish the existence of genuine examples, I have 
chosen to stick with this example for its relative simplicity. It provides, at least, an explanation in the 
sense that, had the phenomenon been noted prior to the mathematical prediction, it would have explained 
that phenomenon.
8 Field (1980) explains how the use of mathematics in such measurements can be dispensed with. 
Without actually following Field in dispensing with this use of mathematics, Field’s machinery should 
convince us that our initial use of real numbers in measurement are merely a means of quantitatively 
representing qualitative differences between wind strength and direction at various points: there is some 
nominalistic content to these measurements, even though they are mathematically indexed. Beyond this 
measurement step, though, I wish to suggest that the subsequent use of a mathematical theory to model 




idealization and abstraction. Our prepared description of wind on the earth’s sur-
face as a tangent vector field enables us to apply the resources of topology to this 
description and so to derive a conclusion about the properties of this vector field. 
And returning to the original phenomenon modelled, we are able to give a physical 
interpretation of this conclusion, stating what this should means we should expect 
about actual wind behaviour. This explains actual wind behaviour structurally, to 
the extent that it is shown to be a consequence of the mathematical structure of the 
physical system, so the explanation is a structural model explanation.
Must a structural model explanation to be true in order to explain? In Bokulich’s 
discussion of such explanations, she focuses on structural explanations where the 
model is a classical system and the phenomena to be explained are quantum phe-
nomena, so that the mathematical structure appealed to in the structural explanation, 
using the mathematical of classical mechanics rather than quantum mechanics, is 
not straightforwardly ‘true of’ the system to be modelled. But whether, in these pro-
posed structural model explanations, the models are close enough in structural terms 
to the phenomena modelled to be genuinely explanatory is something that need not 
immediately concern us here. In all model explanations, the issue of how close a 
model must relate to the phenomenon modelled (and therefore of how ‘true’ the 
model is to the phenomenon it models—or, we may say, how ‘apt’ the model is) in 
order to be explanatory is a complex and contentious matter, but this is not the sense 
of truth that matters for the purposes of the metaphysical question of what status 
should be given to models in model explanations. What we need to ask is, in cases 
where we do think that the model in a structural model explanation is close enough 
to the system modelled in relevant respects to be genuinely explanatory, must we 
accept the existence of the model system itself in order to accept this explanation 
as genuine? What is the metaphysical status of the idealized models appealed to in 
structural model explanations, and in particular, does commitment to the existence 
of mathematical explanations as structural model explanations incur an undesirable 
commitment to abstracta?
There is a strong tradition in discussions of models in the philosophy of science 
of thinking of models as merely imaginary objects. For example, Peter Godrey-
Smith (2009, p. 102) characterises “model-based” science as.
a style of theoretical work in which an imaginary system is introduced and 
investigated—an imaginary population, ecology, neural network, stock market, 
or society. The behavior of the imaginary system is explored, and this is used 
as the basis for an understanding of more complex real-world systems.
This suggests a picture of model building as analogous with storytelling: although 
we appear to speak as if the objects in our models really exist, we are actually just 
telling a story that fleshes out the supposition that there are such things, without 
commitment to the truth of that supposition. (Similarly, with theorizing in the con-
text of a pure mathematical theory, we can view theorists as working out the conse-
quences of the supposition that the axioms of that theory are true, without any com-
mitment to the actual truth of those axioms.) The literal truth of statements uttered 
in describing the models used in model explanations may not be required for those 
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explanations to be explanatory if all we are doing by uttering those statements is 
elaborating on what would be the case were there objects of the sort described.
I do not have the space here develop a nominalist understanding of ideal models 
in empirical science. In Leng (2010) I endorse an account of models as represen-
tations that builds on Kendall Walton’s (1990) account of representation as “prop 
oriented make-believe”, an account that has been developed further in the modelling 
literature in various ways e.g. by Frigg (2010), Toon (2010) and Salis (2019). To the 
extent that a fictionalist account of models in science can be defended, the idealised 
models in ‘structural model explanations’ do not need to exist in order to be utilised 
in explaining physical phenomenon.
What I would like to suggest, then, is that whether we really believe that there 
are abstract systems of ideal objects instantiating an axiomatically characterized 
mathematical structure and appropriately related to a system of physical objects, 
or merely pretend that there are such things, makes no difference to our ability to 
exploit the ‘framing effect’ of a structural model explanation in enabling us to see 
empirical systems as essentially mathematically structured. In mathematical theoriz-
ing we discover what would be true of any system instantiating the axioms (includ-
ing in any subsystem of such a system), and in describing a model (whether real or 
imagined) that allows us to see a physical system as structurally related to a (real or 
imagined) subsystem of a system instantiating a mathematical structure, we are able 
to conclude that certain empirical interpretations of our mathematical results ought 
to be true of the physical system under discussion simply by virtue of its mathe-
matical structure. The framing effect of seeing wind patterns on the earth’s surface 
as modelled by a tangent vector field no more requires the existence of the math-
ematical system one imagines than does the framing effect of seeing those same 
wind patterns as modelled by a hairy ball that one is trying to comb flat requires the 
real existence of said ball. In either case the appropriateness of the imagined model 
allows us to frame facts about the system modelled as holding in virtue of its sharing 
the structure of the model system. And in either case, the explanatory work done by 
the model is that it shows us that those facts were to be expected given the structure 
of the situation modelled.
4.2  Explanatory models, or explanatory structures?
The introduction of idealized models that represent actual physical phenomenon 
into our account of explanation may introduce a new wrinkle, however, as it has 
sometimes been suggested that showing that phenomenon to be explained holds in a 
structurally similar model of a target system cannot suffice to explain that phenom-
enon. For example, James R. Brown argues that it is because mathematics generally 
finds application via enabling us to form tractable models of physical phenomena 
that mathematics cannot play a genuine explanatory role:
Mathematics hooks on to the world by providing representations in the form of 
structurally similar models. The fact that it works this way means that it cannot 
explain physical facts, except in some derivative sense that is far removed from 
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the doctrines of explanation employed in indispensability arguments. (Brown, 
2012, p. 8)
In Brown’s view, the role that structural models have in our theories is to provide 
representations of physical systems. These may aid understanding, by being easier 
to work with than the systems themselves (and allowing us to use familiar descrip-
tive tools). But providing this kind of aide to understanding is a derivative sense of 
explaining, and does not amount to mathematics playing a genuine explanatory role. 
Despite Brown’s own platonism (which he holds on independent grounds), Brown’s 
view of the role of mathematics in explanations is thus in line with those nominalists 
who hold that all the genuine explanatory work in so-called mathematical ‘expla-
nations’ of empirical phenomena resides in the nominalistic content that the math-
ematics helps us to grasp.
By separating out the structural elements of structural model explanations from 
the model elements, we can see where Brown and others go wrong in this regard. 
Brown is absolutely right that, to the extent that the role played by mathematics 
is to provide tractable models of empirical phenomena, the ease of understanding 
that results from having such tractable models is only ‘explanatory’ in a deriva-
tive sense—the models may make the ultimately nominalistic features of the sys-
tems easier for us to grasp, but they are not playing an explanatory role in showing 
us why the phenomena we observe had to be true. However, focus on mathematics 
as providing models diverts attention from the structural features of these models, 
which is where their explanatory work resides. What makes a structural explanation 
explanatory is not just that it displays some ultimately nonmathematical content to 
be true, but rather that it displays that content to be true in virtue of the mathemati-
cal structure of the empirical system under investigation: it shows it to be a con-
sequence of mathematical axioms that are true under an empirical interpretation. 
And what makes a structural model explanation explanatory is again not (just) that 
it displays some nonmathematical content to be true, but that it shows it to be true in 
virtue of the mathematical structure of the situation to be explained, by relating that 
situation in an appropriate manner to a model that instantiates (or is a subsystem of 
a system that instantiates) a given mathematical structure. Structural explanations of 
either sort show why the observed phenomenon had to happen or was to be expected 
given the mathematical structure of the empirical system under study. The nominal-
istic content of these explanations, on the other hand, do no such thing: the insight 
the mathematical structure provides is lost if we simply focus on the content of the 
true descriptive claim that the empirical situation is such as to make the models used 
in these explanations appropriate.
The added explanatory work done by representing empirical phenomena as essen-
tially mathematically structured can make sense of a complaint that Otávio Bueno 
and Mark Colyvan have expressed about the limitations of ‘mapping accounts’ of 
the application of mathematics (such as that of Pincock (2004) and suggested in 
Leng (2005)). Mapping accounts try to explain the applicability of mathematics by 
noting that our mathematical theories and the physical world to which they apply 
are related by structural similarity relations, much like a map is related to a city. It is 
not surprising that we can learn things about a city from studying its map, given the 
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structural similarity relation holding between the map and the city, and it is also not 
surprising that it is helpful for us in discussing the spatial arrangements of objects in 
a city in terms of the map rather than the city itself—it provides a useful simplifica-
tion that can make navigation problems tractable and allow us to ignore the mass of 
irrelevant detail. But, Bueno and Colyvan (2011) note, it would be odd to think that 
the map of the city could by itself explain facts about the city (unless, perhaps, we 
discover that the map was the blueprint from which the city was built). More needs 
to be said in mapping accounts of applications to show how the mathematical theo-
ries we claim to be structurally related to the physical world can explain features of 
that world.
The difference between a mathematical theory and a road map in explanatory 
uses of mathematics is that, while both are models (and hence both are structurally 
similar to the reality they represent), only the mathematical theory involves a struc-
tural model, in the sense of representing the physical world as (approximating) an 
instantiation of (a substructure of) some wider mathematical structure. Rather than 
simply mirroring the structure of an empirical system (as in any model), a structural 
model represents that system as an instance of a mathematical structure. As such, it 
enables us to explain features of that system as holding in virtue of its mathematical 
structure, whenever they can be shown to be empirical interpretations of mathemati-
cal statements that are derivable from the structure’s characterizing axioms. It is not 
mere similarity that matters in the use of mathematical models to explain, but rather, 
the realization that this similarity means that the inferential structure of our mathe-
matical theories carries over to the empirical situation modelled, so that truths about 
the empirical situation can be seen as holding in virtue of its mathematical structure.
5  Conclusion
I have, in this paper, agreed with platonists including Baker and Colyvan that math-
ematics sometimes plays an indispensable explanatory role in empirical science, 
with mathematical hypotheses sometimes doing genuine explanatory (or at least, 
explanation-like) work that is not exhausted by the nominalistic content that those 
hypotheses enable us to represent. Nevertheless, I have argued, the involvement of 
mathematical hypotheses in these explanations does not support platonism. Math-
ematical hypotheses can play this kind of explanatory (or explanation-like) role 
even if there are no abstract mathematical objects, since the role mathematics plays 
in such explanations is of showing physical phenomena to be true in virtue of the 
mathematical structure instantiated (or approximately instantiated) in the physical 
system under study, rather than by appealing to abstract mathematical objects per se. 
In structural explanations, we have examples of distinctively mathematical explana-
tions which show their explananda to hold by virtue of logical necessity given the 
mathematical structure instantiated in the physical system. When structure-charac-
terising axioms are interpreted so as to be true of a particular physical system, we 
can generate mathematical explanations of physical phenomena that do not appeal to 
any abstract mathematical objects, but instead only require modal truths about what 
follows logically from our mathematical assumptions, together with the recognition 
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that the assumptions of our mathematical theories are true when interpreted as about 
the physical system under examination.
Given, however, the amount of idealization that is generally required in order to 
apply mathematics to physical systems, most mathematical explanations of empiri-
cal phenomena will involve intermediate idealized models, rather than the direct 
instantiation of mathematical structures in physical systems, where what is directly 
explained by these structural explanations is features of an idealized model that 
instantiates our mathematical axioms. The presence of these models as intermediar-
ies may raise concerns that such explanations are committed to abstract mathemati-
cal objects, or at the very least, to abstract idealizations of physical objects whose 
status is arguably as questionable as the abstract mathematical objects that math-
ematical fictionalists try to avoid. I have suggested that when idealized models are 
introduced into explanations, mathematical theories are used to provide structural 
explanations of the features of these models, which can then be used to explain fea-
tures of the physical systems they model to the extent that the models provide apt 
representations. And I have proposed an understanding of idealized models in sci-
ence that views them as a form of ‘make-believe’ or pretense. In such cases, when 
we speak of similarities between the physical system and the model, we are indi-
rectly asserting that the physical system is the way it would have to be to make the 
pretense appropriate. So we can speak as if there are objects as imagined in our 
idealized theoretical models in order to represent how things are taken to be with the 
physical systems with which we are ultimately concerned. The models in structural 
model explanations need not, then, present any new worry the nominalist who takes 
it that fictions can be used to represent without the objects of fictions existing.
What this paper has not, of course, established is that all explanatory or explana-
tion-like uses of mathematical hypotheses occur in the context of structural model 
explanations. I have not argued (and indeed I do not hold) that all explanation is struc-
tural explanation, and it is at least conceivable that examples could be found where 
mathematics plays a genuine explanatory role but where the explanation given is not 
structural. However, the dual role of mathematics identified in this discussion—as 
providing amenable, abstracted models of reality that are easy to work with, and as 
identifying features of those models that hold in virtue of structure-characterizing 
mathematical axioms, seems to me at least to get at some of the key elements of what 
it is so special about mathematics that makes it such a useful tool in both describing 
and explaining empirical phenomena. If there are other features of mathematics in 
application that have been overlooked, and that can be exploited to show mathematics 
to be explanatory in other ways, I would certainly be keen to hear of them. But what 
I hope to have shown in this paper is that there is a gap between showing that math-
ematics can play an indispensable explanatory (or explanation-like) role and showing 
that the existence of mathematical objects (or the truth of our mathematical theories) 
is required for mathematics to play such a role. We should not automatically infer, 
of the best explanation we have of a phenomena, that it is true, but only that it does 
indeed explain. The question then needs to be asked, “How does it explain?”, and it is 
in the details of answering this question that we may hope to uncover the metaphysi-
cal commitments of our taking the explanation to be explanatory.
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